The anti-zombie argument for physicalism by Frankish, Keith
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
The anti-zombie argument for physicalism
Other
How to cite:
Frankish, Keith (2005). The anti-zombie argument for physicalism. Not Set.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© [not recorded]
Version: Not Set
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
 The anti-zombie argument for physicalism 
Keith Frankish 
The Open University, UK 
1. Terminology 
Physical property: either a microphysical property or a property that is microphysically realized. 
Physicalism: the view that phenomenal properties are physical ones.  
Dualism: the view that phenomenal properties are not physical ones. 
Microphysical property: a property of the sort invoked by physicists. 
Bare microphysical duplicate: a is a bare microphysical duplicate of b if a is a duplicate of b in all and only 
its microphysical aspects.  
Zombies: beings which are bare microphysical duplicates of us and which inhabit a universe which is a bare 
microphysical duplicate of ours, but which lack phenomenal consciousness.  
2. The zombie argument  
1)  It is conceivable that there be zombies. 
2) If it is conceivable that there be zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there be zombies. 
3) If it is metaphysically possible that there be zombies, then consciousness is nonphysical. 
4) Consciousness is nonphysical. 
(From Chalmers 2002a, 249) 
(2) is an instance of The CP thesis: if a situation is conceivable, then it is metaphysically possible.  
3. The anti-zombie argument 
Anti-zombies: beings which are bare microphysical duplicates of us and inhabit a universe which is a bare 
microphysical duplicate of ours, but which nonetheless have exactly the same conscious states we do.  
5) It is conceivable that there be anti-zombies. 
6) If it is conceivable that there be anti-zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there be anti-zombies. 
7)  If it is metaphysically possible that there be anti-zombies, then the microphysical features of our world 
are metaphysically sufficient for the existence of consciousness. 
8) The microphysical features of our world are metaphysically sufficient for the existence of 
consciousness. 
9)  If the microphysical features of our world are metaphysically sufficient for consciousness, then 
consciousness is physical. 
10) Consciousness is physical. 
The P-world: a bare microphysical duplicate of the actual world.  
Zombists and anti-zombists disagree as to whether the P-worlders are conscious.  
• If the P-worlders are not conscious, then zombies are possible; if they are, then anti-zombies are 
possible.  
• The possibility of zombies is incompatible with that of anti-zombies.  
• Assuming the CP thesis is correct, the conceivability of zombies is incompatible with that of anti-
zombies.  
• If both zombies and anti-zombies are conceivable, then the CP thesis is false.  
• One of the following is false: (a) The CP thesis, (b) Zombies are conceivable, (c) Anti-zombies are 
conceivable. Zombists must reject (c).  
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4. Are anti-zombies conceivable? 
Terminology from Chalmers 2002b: 
Prima facie conceivable: conceivable on first appearances.  
Ideally conceivable: such that it remains conceivable after ideal rational reflection.  
Negatively conceivable: such that it cannot be ruled out a priori.  
Positively conceivable: such that we can form a clear imaginative conception of it.  
• Anti-zombies are prima facie negatively conceivable. (Physicalists are not that wrong!) 
• Anti-zombies are prima facie positively conceivable. The intuition of distinctness can be explained 
away as arising from the nature of our phenomenal concepts.  
The point is, how can I tell, merely from facts about my own cognitive situation, including facts about 
various conceptual relations among my representations, that what one representation refers to is distinct 
from what another one refers to? … The bottom line is that my representations seem to present me with 
two distinct properties. But the possibility that distinct representations really refer to the same thing must 
always be an open one. (Levine 2001, 91) 
5. Is there a non-obvious a priori argument against the anti-zombie scenario? 
Strategy 1: Argue that zombies are ideally conceivable, the CP is true, so anti-zombies are not.  
Reply: Simply pits one conceivability intuition against another.  
Strategy 2: Argue that, on analysis, the concept of a phenomenal property is that of a non-physical property, 
so it is a priori that phenomenal concepts do not apply to anything in the anti-zombie world.  
Reply: It is question-begging to use such theoretically loaded concepts. If phenomenal properties are defined 
as non-physical, then physicalists will deny that consciousness is to be characterized in terms of them.  
Strategy 3: Appeal to an a priori argument for the falsity of physicalism. The anti-zombie world is defined 
as one in which physicalism is true. So if it is a priori that physicalism is false, then it is a priori that the 
description of the anti-zombie world is incoherent.  
Reply: The strategy is sound, but zombists face a dilemma. If they appeal to the zombie argument itself, then 
this proposal faces the same objection the first one. If they appeal to an independent anti-physicalist 
argument, then the zombie argument is redundant.  
6. Lessons 
1.  The CP thesis is a two-edged sword. 
2.  The zombie argument cannot be the fundamental anti-physicalist one.  
3.  Considerations of conceivability have little role to play in establishing the truth or falsity of 
physicalism.  
Closing thought: The anti-zombie argument was conceived simply as a tactical device to neutralize the 
zombie argument. But might it be actually be sound? 
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